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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The paper aims to assess the impact of privatisation on employment and 
output in Pakistan. It uses edible oil and cement sectors as a case study in a pre- and 
post-privatisation comparative framework. Assessing the impact of privatisation in 
Pakistan is important at this juncture for two reasons. Firstly, the country is facing a 
severe economic crisis and privatisation forms an integral part of an array of reform 
measures recommended by multi-lateral donors as well as policy-makers within and 
without the country.  Burki [(2000), p. 152] observes, “The economy and state of 
Pakistan are in crisis…. Pakistan has not faced a crisis of this magnitude in its entire 
50-year history”. He refers to the five different crises that have combined to create 
this situation. These are: the global financial crisis, Pakistan’s short-term liquidity 
problem, economy’s structural weaknesses, severe social backwardness, and, finally, 
the crisis of governance. Burki (2000) suggests several solutions to the problems, 
and privatisation is one of the ways to restructure the economy and improve the 
quality of governance. 
Secondly, privatisation is at an initial stage. Most of the enterprises privatised 
are either small or capital-intensive, and their impact on the economy and society has 
so far been relatively limited. All the large public enterprises are yet to be divested. 
If a large proportion of employees are divested without taking appropriate measures 
to provide necessary safeguards for them, it can have severe social, economic and 
political repercussions. This research allows us to assess the impact of privatisation 
on already divested smaller enterprises, and draws lessons for the privatisation of 
larger and more labour-intensive enterprises in the future. Privatisation is a holistic 
term and over the years has assumed a wide range of meanings and connotations. 
Broadly, it stands for transferring the right of the state to other agents to influence 
directly the allocation of capital resources to non-state entities, to whom the residual 
or net profits of utilising assets accrue [Brabanti (1995)]. Cook and Kirkpatrick 
(1994) have cited The Economist (August 21-27 1993) that refers to at least 57 
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varieties of privatisations reflecting differences in economic and political conditions 
and structural characteristics of each economy. In Pakistan, privatisation includes “a 
transaction by virtue of which any property, right, interest, concession or 
management thereof is transferred to any person from the Federal Government or 
any enterprise owned or controlled, wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, by the 
Federal Government” [PC (2000), p.  1].  
The rest of the paper is as follows. The introduction is followed by a brief 
literature review on the relationship between privatisation, equity and employment. 
Section 3 provides the background on Pakistan’s privatisation programme. Sections 
4 and 5 describe the dataset and discuss methodology and inference procedures, 
while Section 6 reports the results. The penultimate section lists policy implications 
accruing from the study, and the last section concludes the discussion. 
 
2.  PRIVATISATION, EQUITY, AND EMPLOYMENT: 
REVIEW OF ISSUES 
Discussion on the relationship between privatisation and equity is a much-
neglected area in academic literature [Oestmann (1994); De Luca (1997); Birdsall 
and Nellis (2002)]. Though a lot of research has been done to understand the 
dynamics of privatisation and efficiency, equity or distribution is generally 
introduced as a gratuitous, though still a ubiquitous, issue in the whole discussion, 
and here too, in the words of Birdsall and Nellis (2002), it is meant to grease the 
wheels of the process to make it “politically more palatable” (p. 8). It has been 
considered more of an aside and at best a “natural corollary” to privatisation. It is 
only lately that empirical studies have tried to change the context of the debate by 
focusing on distributional issues.  
Though the social or welfare impact of privatisation has broad connotations, it 
is employment that has been central to the debate. Most of the literature [see Birdsall 
and Nellis (2002); Khan (2003) for a review], while referring to the social impact of 
privatisation, is actually restricted to its employment dimension only. Even the 
reduction in wages and worsening working conditions are not that acute a problem 
relative to the loss of employment, which is regarded as an important indicator of 
poverty [Azam (1994)]. It is for this reason, that one of the earliest studies on the 
social impact of privatisation, [Kikeri (1997)], confines the analysis to the 
employment aspect only. 
There is consensus among researchers and academicians that privatisation has 
implications for the employees and their conditions of work. However, there are 
differences of opinion on the nature and extent of the impact of privatisation. Cook 
and Kirkpatrick (1998) point out that the impact of privatisation on employment will 
correspond with the comparative importance of public enterprise sector in the 
national economy as well as its share in formal employment. Gupta, et al. (1999) 
find an inverse relationship between retrenchment and competition. 
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Though it is generally believed that privatisation leads to a fall in employment 
and wages at least in the short term, the literature survey conducted by Cook and 
Kirkpatrick (1998) shows that this is not always the case.  Gupta, et al. (1999); 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998); Megginson, Nash, and van-Randenborgh (1994); Kikeri 
(1997); Ramanadham (1989) and Estrin and Svejnar (1998), among others, point out 
that privatisation may even increase employment if due to overall improvement in 
the economy, privatised firms are tempted to inject new capital investments. This is 
also the view proffered by the World Bank and associates who believe that there is a 
positive correlation between privatisation and economic growth [Galal, et al. (1994); 
Plane (1997); Barnett (2000); Davis, et al. (2000)].  
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1998) cite a number of reasons for this counter-
intuitive result. First, they argue, the sample of divested firms is likely to suffer from 
a selection bias. Due to the private entrepreneurs’ preference for more profitable and 
efficient firms, it is more likely that profitable or potentially profitable firms are 
privatised first. Secondly, in many instances government has provided employment 
guarantees to the employees for a certain period of time. This defers the employment 
impact of privatisation up to the time such guarantees are valid. Thirdly, many 
governments have undertaken restructuring programmes in case of large enterprises 
to prepare them for privatisation. Such public enterprises are already lean and are 
ready for expansion in the post-privatisation period. Finally, the rise in employment 
and productivity may conceal the deteriorating contractual conditions of those 
workers who remain in employment after privatisation [see also Cam (1999) for 
discussion].  
Gupta, et al. (1999) graphically present the dynamics of employment changes 
over the three periods, i.e., pre-privatisation, privatisation and post-privatisation, and 
show that the level of employment follows a U-curve: declining during the first two 
periods and increasing in the third one (Figure 1 below). They also take account of 
the “deferred retrenchment” phenomenon, which occurs when governments 
guarantee employment for a certain period of time. The dark line in the figure refers 
to the employment U-curve without any post-privatisation employment guarantees, 
while the one in light shade accounts for delays in employees’ lay offs due to 
employment guarantees. They, however, acknowledge that in some cases, 
restructuring and privatisation may reduce the employment levels almost 
permanently and in case of liquidation, all the employees may lose jobs. In such 
circumstances, the U-curve pattern will not be valid. 
Gupta, et al. (1999), however, ignore another dimension of the issue. Kemal 
(2000) points out that in case of Pakistan, employment guarantees have expedited, 
rather then postponed, the process of retrenchment. Employees, fearing to lose their 
jobs or employment benefits after the one-year guarantee period, opted for voluntary 
retirement scheme. A rather generous golden handshake package provided further 
incentive to them.  
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Fig. 1. Employment U-Curve with/without Deferred Retrenchment. 
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Source:  Adopted from Gupta, et al. (1999). 
 
While privatisation is likely to have severe consequences for the workers, 
managers are mostly the beneficiaries. They, therefore, either advocate it [see Harris 
(1995) or at least show lower levels of uncertainty and stress [Nelson, et al. (1995) 
and Cam (1999)]. It has been well-documented that in both developed and 
developing economies, the managers have benefited in terms of better pay and perks 
packages after privatisation [De Luca (1997); Martin and Parker (1997) among 
others]. This differential between the workers and managers should be present in 
Pakistan as well, though it has not been recorded so far.  
 
3.  PRIVATISATION IN PAKISTAN: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 
Though Privatisation Commission (PC) was established in Pakistan as one 
aspect of the 1988 IMF/World Bank structural adjustment package [Kemal (1996); 
Cameroon (1997) and Paddon (1997)], there was not much conviction behind it on 
the part of government of Pakistan [Kemal (1996)].  PC [(2000), p. 5] asserts that 
privatisation is a “very much home-grown programme”, but the fact is that aid was 
conditioned with the restructuring and privatisation of public enterprises [see Mirza 
(1995) for examples].  
Since privatisation is an imported phenomenon in Pakistan, it had no clearly 
spelled out objectives initially. The government reports on privatisation do not list 
even a single privatisation objective until 1992 [Qureshi (1992)]. It was as late as 
1996, that the broad contours of privatisation policy and its objectives emerged [PC 
(1996b)]. This failure can be attributed to the fact that privatisation was adopted on 
the instructions of multilateral donors, and the emphasis was more on understanding 
the procedural aspects of privatisation rather than policy and its implications. 
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The objectives of privatisation are not much different from those in other 
countries of the world. According to Kh. Muhammad Asif, ex-Chairman 
Privatisation Commission, the government programme for privatisation is based on 
“the principle of reducing its direct participation in commercial activities” and 
ensuring “equity and economic justice” [Asif (1998)].   PC [(2000), p. 7] highlights 
the need for privatisation: “distorted prices, lack of competition, and poor 
government management of business have hindered economic development, 
introduced inefficiencies, generated unproductive and unsustainable employment, 
slowed down investment, reduced access to services by the poor, resulted in sub-
standard goods and services, and contributed to fiscal bleeding”.  By privatising, 
government intends to reverse the shortcomings outlined above. 
Kemal (2000) points out that six regular and six caretaker governments have 
been in power from 1985 and privatisation has been the cornerstone of the 
economic programme of each government [also see Qureshi (1992); PC (1996a, 
1997, 2000)]. During this time, the privatisation objectives have more or less 
enjoyed a national consensus. However, there has been some change in emphasis 
and priorities. This is especially noticeable after the army came to power in 1999. 
Due to the scandals and controversies that blemished the privatisation efforts of 
previous civilian governments, transparency and fairness has become an important 
policy objective that has now been spelled out more clearly in the Privatisation 
Ordinance 2000 [PC (2000)]. Another objective that does not appear in explicit 
terms before is seeing privatisation as a means to reduce corruption. However, 
there has been little change in priority: placing the consumers, taxpayers and 
employees at the bottom of the list.  
By the end of May 2002, the GOP had completed or approved 122 
transactions [PC (2002)]. This number also includes some multiple transactions 
for the same unit. The gross privatisation proceeds stand at Rs 82.0 billion or 
US$ 2.3 billion based on the exchange rate prevailing at the time of respective 
transactions. Telecom and power sectors alone account for around 65 percent of 
all the proceeds [PC (2002)]. Kemal (2000) points out that with privatisation, 
around 35000 employees in the manufacturing sector were transferred to the 
private sector, out of which 63.3 percent opted for the golden handshake scheme 
(GHS).  
 
4.  DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary source is field surveys, while the secondary source is the “Monthly Survey 
of Industrial Production and Employment” published by the Punjab Bureau of 
Statistics. The names of privatised companies and relevant information is given in 
Table 1 below:  
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Table 1 
List of Privatised Firms1 
        Name of the Firm 
Date 
Privatised
Price 
Sold (Rs 
Millions)
Production 
(Metric 
Tons) 
Total 
Employees 
(No.) 
Employees 
Retrenched 
(No.) 
Edible Oil Firms 
1. Sh. Fazal and Sons Ltd. April 1992 64.28 19,499 – 285 
2. Kakakhel Industries Ltd. May 1992 71.40 20,647 304 240 
3. United Industries Ltd. May 1992 53.46 28,867 550 – 
4. Crescent Factories Jan 1993 63.00 15,185 423 368 
5. Khyber Vegetable Mills (Pvt) Ltd. Jan 1993 8.00 5,793 – – 
6. Suraj Ghee Industries Ltd. Jan 1993 41.58 20,790 296 – 
7. Punjab Vegetable Oil Ghee May 1999 18.74 8,914 – – 
Cement Firms 
1. Maple Leaf Co. Ltd. Jan 1992 291.28 408,410 707 109 
2. White Cement Ltd. Jan 1992 137.47 Merged 131 30 
3. Pak Cement Co. Ltd. Jan 1992 188.95 -do- 231 9 
4. D. G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. May 1992 1799.67 544,034 503 28 
5. Gharibwal Cement Ltd. Sep 1992 836.67 537,514 817 226 
6. National Cement Industries (Pvt) Ltd. Jan 1995 110.00 47,428 – – 
7. Associated (Wah) Cement Feb 1996 2752.10 361,406 – – 
8. Dandot Cement Co. Ltd. Feb 1996 636.69 237,333 740 33 
Source: Privatisation Commission (2000); PAD (1995), and Personal Survey.  
 
The above Table above provides desegregated information on seven edible oil and 
eight cement sector firms, while the time series dimension includes twenty years (1981-
2000). However, for different reasons, it was not possible to include all the firms in the 
dataset, and the data was also missing for some years in a few cases. Firms had to be 
excluded from the sample due to the closure or merger of units before and after 
privatisation. In the edible oil sector, four firms remained closed during different periods 
before and after privatisation. Suraj Ghee Industries stopped working in 1993 within two 
months of privatisation [PAD (1995)]. Due to the closure of this unit, it is not possible to 
undertake any comparative pre- and post-privatisation study. Sh. Fazal & Sons Ltd. was 
closed in 1997 five years after privatisation. Here again, three years are lost in the post-
privatisation period. Both Khyber Vegetable Ghee Mills and Punjab Vegetable Ghee 
Mills were closed, and employed only a few watchmen at the time of privatisation of 
their assets in 1993 and 1999 respectively [PAD (1995)]. Due to the closure of these units 
for the entire sample period, they have been excluded from the analysis. This effectively 
leaves us with just five (including Sh. Fazal and Sons Ltd.) firms in the edible oil sector 
to undertake the pre- and post-privatisation performance exercise. 
As for the cement sector, it also underwent major changes after privatisation. 
Since most of the units were profitable, they were bought by reputable business houses 
that had considerable stakes in the industry. These acquisitions, therefore, led to mergers 
 
1“…” indicates data not available. 
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between different firms. White and Pak cement units were merged with Maple Leaf 
cement, since one business group had purchased these units. Due to these mergers, data is 
not available separately for these three units. Dandot Cement, which was bought by a 
foreign entrepreneur, was closed at the end of 1997 after privatisation and resumed 
operation in March 2000 [Ghausi (2000)]. National cement has also been closed from 
1999. As a result, data is not available for these units after 1997 and 1999 respectively. 
The omission of three (in one case partial) out of seven firms in the edible oil 
sector and the closure of two firms in the cement sector at the end of the sample period 
have introduced a substantial selection bias. Healthy and profitable firms that were able 
to compete in the market and show vigour and resilience at times of economic recession 
have been included in the sample, while the poorly-performing firms had to be closed 
down, and are omitted for the absence of data. The results, therefore, are expected to be 
upwards biased and are likely to present an over-optimistic scenario.  
 
4.1.  Definition of Variables 
The data has been collected for employment, wages and production for each 
firm in the sample. The data for employment are monthly averages and refer to the 
number of workers employed at the end of the month. The same is true for wages that 
are given in thousands. The employment and wage data are available separately for 
both ‘production’ and ‘non-production’ workers. In the questionnaire used by the 
Punjab Bureau of Statistics, the production workers are defined as those “engaged on 
work directly associated with production. It includes those engaged in manufacturing, 
assembling, packing, repairing, etc. Work supervisors should be included. Persons 
engaged in repair and maintenance are also to be included. … [Nonproduction workers 
mean] managers, engineers, professional and administrative employees. [This 
category] includes salaried directors, managers, administrative supervisors, accountants, 
engineers, research workers, etc.” These two categories broadly represent manual and 
non-manual staff. The manual workers in our sample do not include daily-wagers or 
part time employees, though the survey covers contractual workers. Wages and salaries 
mean “payments made to employees as remuneration for their work. It includes 
advances, and payments for leave”, but does not include other cash benefits such as 
allowances, bonuses, commissions and employers contribution to social security 
schemes or provident fund. Similarly non-cash benefits do not form part of wages. 
The data for production/output is in metric tons and is a monthly average. 
However, instead of output/production, value of production has been used in the 
regression. This interaction variable combines the effect of price and output, and is a 
proxy for sales. For the edible oil, it is the mean price of 12 urban centres of Pakistan 
[Pakistan (2002)], while data for the price of cement has been gathered from the 
State Cement Corporation and pertains only to the ordinary grey cement at the 
beginning of each financial year (1st July). 
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Two dummy variables have been also added to the equations. Dummy for 
privatisation, denoted by Oit, captures the impact of ownership change from public to 
private hands. It is 0 for the pre-privatisation period and 1 afterwards. Since 
privatisation leads to fall in employment and wages in the short run, we would expect 
this variable to be negative. However, as the literature shows, privatisation in so many 
cases has benefited the managers rather than the workers. It is quite probable that the 
coefficients for ownership dummy are positive for managers’ employment. 
The second dummy variable, denoted by Sapit, attempts to control for other non-
privatisation macro-economic policy instruments that might affect a firm’s 
performance. These policies are reflected through the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP), which Pakistan started implementing from 1988. It is 0 before 
1988 and 1 afterwards.  Since SAP leads to reduced demand (for discussion in case of 
Pakistan see [Kemal (1993, 1994); Murasaki and Matsushita (1998); Majid (2000); 
Kemal (2001)], which in turn results in lower output and employment levels, the 
dummy variable for the structural adjustment programme is expected to be negative.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND INFERENCE PROCEDURE 
This paper uses an econometric model, which is an extension of the single 
equation model used by Bhaskar (1992) and Bhaskar and Khan (1995). While their 
studies compare the performance of jute mills in Bangladesh in the same period, this 
study focuses on the pre- and post-privatisation performance of similar firms, which 
switched hands from the public to private sector.2   The econometric model for 
describing employment for the ith firm in the tth time period is given by the 
following function:  
),)(,)(( itititit VmWwWE ∫=  … … … … … (1) 
While Eit is the employment in number of the i th firm, i = 1,2,3…,15 in the tth time 
period, t = 1, 2, 3,…, 20; W(w)it W(m)it and Vit are the wages in thousands for workers, 
for managers and value of production in the tth time period for the ith firm respectively. 
A general stochastic model corresponding to Equation (1) above will be: 
ititit XY µ+β+α=  … … … … … … (2) 
Here, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, while µit is the conventional error term. 
The equation estimated is a double log model in first difference of the following form:  
itititit
itititiit
sapOv
mwwwte
ε++β+∆β
+∆β+∆β+α+α=∆ −
)()ln(
))(ln())(ln()(ln(
43
211  
Here, the dependent variable is the first difference of the natural log of total 
employment for firm i in time period t.  On the right hand side of the equation appear, 
 
2Frydman, et al. (1997) call them synchronic and historical approaches respectively. 
… … (3)
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in sequential order, the constant term, lagged dependent variable, the first difference 
of natural log of average real wages for workers, for managers and total value of 
output for firm i in time period t . The parameters of interest are the dummy variable 
Oit and sapit that control for the impact of changes in ownership and macro-economic 
policies respectively. Similar models have been formulated to assess the impact of 
privatisation on employment for workers (dlewit), managers (dlemit) and output 
(dlprodit). The use of first difference of level variables in logs corresponds to the log 
annual rates of growth [Mairesse (1990) and Mukherjee, et al. (1998)]. 
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM)3 type instruments have been used 
to control for the problem of endogeneity, which arises due to dynamic panel data 
estimation. In dynamic models, the OLS estimator of α will be inconsistent and 
upward biased due to serial correlation between the autoregressive (yi,t–1), parameter 
and the error term (ηi + νit). This inconsistency persists even when N or T grows 
large. Though Pesaran and Smith (1995) have suggested that serial correlation can be 
removed by first differencing, they express their reservations as to the generalisation 
of this approach. In such a situation, a dynamic panel data model with instrumental 
variable (IV) should provide accurate and consistent results. 
There are different IV estimators,4  but Blundell and Bond (1998) recommend 
using a SYS-GMM (also called Combined-GMM) estimation procedure that uses 
lagged levels of yit as instruments in addition to the lagged differences of yit for 
equation in first differences. These additional instruments improve the precision and 
efficiency of the basic first-differenced GMM estimators proposed earlier by 
Arrelano and Bond (1991). The idea is to make use of the orthogonality condition 
that exists between yit and the disturbances νit. An efficient GMM estimator will 
typically exploit different number instruments in each time period. 
Although there are certain advantages in using differenced equations, the 
transformation provides results which reflect only a short term perspective. 
Secondly, as O’Mahony and Vecchi (2001) point out, when dummies are included 
in the SYS-GMM which compounds a specification in first difference and in levels, 
they pick up level effects. Such level effects are not justified, since real values are 
not defined in a comparable sense. It is, therefore, necessary to find a procedure, 
which allows us to estimate dummies and also control for the level effects. Black 
and Lynch (2001) suggest a two-stage procedure, which has also been used by 
O’Mahony and Vecchi (2001) and Hay (2001) amongst others. In the first stage, 
Black and Lynch (2001) estimate a standard production function on the panel data-
set and save the firm-specific components of the residuals, which are then 
regressed, in the second step, on dummy variables to obtain time-invariant 
estimates. This two-stage procedure has also been used for estimation in this paper. 
 
3For a detailed discussion, see Baltagi (2001). 
4For a discussion, see Arrelano and Bond (1991); Ahn and Schmidt (1995); Arrelano and Bover 
(1995); Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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Following many authors [Arrelano and Bond (1991); Blundell and Bond 
(1998); Blundell, et al. (2000); Bond and Windmeijer (2001); Hay (2001); Bond 
(2002); Bond and Windmeijer (2002); Christev and Fitzroy (2002) amongst others], 
time dummies have also been used to adequately reflect and control for the internal 
and external shocks to the economy. They have been used in both the first and 
second stages of estimation.  
 
6.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The evidence has been reported in two ways. The preliminary results are 
reported by using graphs to depict different trends emanating from the data. Though 
the analysis here is rather basic and crude, it highlights some initial trends, and sets 
the stage for a more complex and dynamic regression analysis at a later stage.  
 
6.1.  Preliminary Data Analysis  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 below compare the public and private sector firms for 
the 1981–2000 period in the edible oil and cement industries respectively. In the 
graphs, “PEs” stands for the privatised public enterprises, while “Priv” denotes the 
remaining private sector firms. In other words, the former are firms in the sample, 
while the latter are remaining firms in the sector. Though the firms were divested in 
different years, as is evident from Table 1, most of them were privatised during 
1992-93, and is denoted by the vertical dotted lines in the graphs. This year, 
therefore, serves as the divide between the pre- and post-privatisation periods, 
though this approximate and imprecise division between the two phases limits the 
accuracy of analysis.  
 
6.1.1.  The Edible Oil Sector  
Figure 2 has 8 graphs, each representing trends for employment, wages, output 
and productivity. Graphs 1 to 3 show that public enterprises, on average, employed 
more workers and managers than the private sector firms in the edible oil sector. The 
latter have lower level of employment and also show a slow but steady decline. This is 
in sharp contrast with the public sector firms in which employment falls abruptly and 
sharply in 1992-93, the year they are privatised. After the initial shock of privatisation 
is over, the employment is rising after 1997.5  Second and third graphs, depicting 
trends for workers’ and managers’ employment, also follow a similar pattern. However, 
compared with the private sector, the public sector initially employed lower number of 
managers. The situation changed when their number continued to decline steadily in 
the private sector, though they increased in the public sector. 
As for wages (Graphs 4 to 6), they are initially the same but later increase in 
the public sector in the pre-privatisation period, though this trend is reversed after  
 
5We must keep the important and crucial caveat in mind that the sample includes only those firms 
which were robust enough to withstand the shock of privatisation and were the most profitable ones. 
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Fig. 2. Comparative Performance of Edible Oil Firms in the  
Public and Private Sectors. 
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Sources:  PAD (1995); Punjab Bureau of Statistics (2000); Pakistan (2002), and Personal Survey. 
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Fig. 3. The Comparative Performance of Public Sector 
Cement Firms in Punjab. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  Punjab Bureau of Statistics (2000); and Personal Survey; Pakistan (2002). 
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privatisation. While wages in the public sector show a sharp decline coinciding with 
privatisation, this is less pronounced in the private sector. Privatisation also pushes 
the wage level below the one being paid in the private sector, though it gets even at a 
later stage. This shows the acute and intense nature of privatisation that afflicts the 
wage levels of employees, and it is some time before the employees recover from it. 
As for output, it was much higher when the firms were in the public sector, and 
shows a sudden fall after privatisation. This fall coincides with an almost 80 percent 
increase in prices, and it seems that the manufacturers lowered output levels to raise 
prices and maximise their profits. As for labour productivity, the privatised firms 
perform better than their private sector counterparts, though the difference is getting 
minimised at the end.  
 
6.1.2.  The Cement Sector  
Figure 3 presents employment, wage and output trends for the cement industry. 
The analysis is restricted to firms in the public sector only, because the cement industry 
was a state monopoly up to 1994. The graphs, however, show a trend different from the 
one observed for the edible oil sector.  Privatisation results in a sharp fall only in case 
of workers’ wages (Graphs 5), while there is a steady but smooth decline in 
employment (Graphs 1 to 3), total wages and a rise in both output and productivity 
(Graphs 7 to 8). Unlike the edible oil sector, the fall in employment is smooth and 
surprisingly starts from the mid-1980s, when the units were still in the public sector. 
There is no sharp fall in employment in the post-privatisation phase due to only 36 
percent retrenchment in the cement sector against 74 percent for the edible oil industry. 
A comparison between workers and managers (Graphs 2 and 3) shows that, while the 
workers steadily lost their jobs, this has not been the case for managers despite some 
ups and downs in wages. However, this trend is not unpredicted in capital-intensive 
industries [Majid (2000)]. This means that white-collar employees or those in higher 
income brackets are not only less likely to lose their jobs, as the Graph 3 shows, but 
will also continue to get a consistently better pay package, as is evident from Graph 5. 
This puts managers in a far better position than the workers. The output level also 
declined at the end due to excess supply and regressive demand [Majid (2000)], but 
Graph 8 depicts high productivity, which has increased in the last few years. 
 
6.2.  Results from Regression Analysis  
 
6.2.1.  Dynamic Panel Data Estimation  
The empirical findings have been reported in Table 2. The regressions were 
run separately for total employment (le(t)), employment for workers (le(w)), 
managers (le(m)) and output (lprod) as dependent variables. T-values have been 
reported within brackets below the coefficient values with a, b and c representing 1, 
5 and 10 percent level of statistical significance respectively. 
Iram A. Khan 526
Table 2 
Results for the Employment Equations (SYS-GMM Estimator) 
Y 
X 
dle(t) 
(1) 
dle(w) 
(2) 
dle(m) 
(3) 
dlprod 
(3) 
First Stage 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.72a 
[7.43] 
0.81a 
[8.86] 
0.84a 
[5.89] 
1.085a 
[9.53] 
dlw(w) –0.27b  
[–2.01] 
–0.31b  
[–2.51] 
–0.77b 
[2.22] 
–0.96 
[1.15] 
dlw(w)_1 0.13 
[0.49] 
0.23b 
[2.19] 
–0.70b  
[–1.99] 
1.42 
[1.15] 
dlw(m) –0.11 
[0.55] 
0.10  
[–1.05] 
–0.717b  
[–2.10] 
–0.69b 
[–2.19] 
dlw(m) _1 0.232c 
[1.66] 
0.081 
[0.123] 
0.582b 
[2.05] 
–0.18 
[0.78] 
dlv 0.05c 
[1.69] 
0.023 
[0.040] 
0.389a 
[3.69] 
– 
dlv_1 –0.08b  
[–2.35] 
–0.038 
[0.071] 
–0.406b  
[–3.49] 
– 
N 167 167 167 175 
Wald (Joint) 2596.0a  5447.0a 194.1a 2334.0a 
Sargan 35.63 
[0.840] 
38.77 
[0.732] 
32.02 
[0.277] 
39.65 
[0.658] 
AR(1) –2.21 
[0.027] 
–1.859 
[0.063] 
–1.615 
[0.106] 
–1.717 
[0.086] 
AR(2) –0.5890 
[0.556] 
0.3331 
[0.739] 
0.8897 
[0.374] 
0.2244 
[0.822] 
Second Stage 
O –0.13b  
[–2.84] 
–0.116a 
[–2.61] 
–0.188 
[–1.27] 
–0.123 
[–0.48] 
sap –0.002 
[–0.148] 
–0.03c 
[1.91] 
0.018 
[0.519] 
–1.60a  
[–6.21] 
R2 0. 02 0.010 0.01 0.01 
N 157 157 157 165 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
Constant and time dummies included in both the first and second stages of regressions. 
 
The diagnostics have been analysed and discussed before proceeding to the 
main results. An important test in GMM-type estimation is the Sargan χ2 test for the 
validity of instruments used in the regressions. This test passes in all four regressions. 
The test for first and second-order autocorrelations, represented by AR(1) and AR(2) 
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respectively, has also been provided. Arrelano and Bond (1991, pp. 281-282) point 
out that the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does 
not imply inconsistency in the estimates. However, the presence of a second-order 
autocorrelation does prove that the estimates are inconsistent. The results for 16 the 
AR(2) shows that the second-order autocorrelation does not exist, and the estimates 
are consistent and unbiased for all the four regressions. 
Intercept term and time dummies were included in both first and second stages 
of all the regressions but have not been reported. Regressions were also run without 
time dummies (results not reported) to see their impact on different explanatory 
variables. They had a dramatic effect on the ownership and sap dummies with 
respect to the signs of the coefficients as well as their statistical significance, while 
their impact on other variables was only marginal. This shows the importance of 
including time dummies in the regressions to control for the effect of internal and 
external shocks. 
In the main results, the variables of interest are the dummies for ownership 
(O) and for the structural adjustment programme (sap), proxying for the impact of 
macro-economic changes in the country. Results show that ownership change leads 
to 13, 11.6 and 18.8 percent fall in total employment, and workers’ and managers’ 
employment respectively. Privatisation also results in 12.3 percent drop in output. 
However, the coefficients are statistically significant for total and workers’ 
employment only. 
The results for the dummy of macro-economic changes (sap) show that 
they are statistically significant for workers’ employment and output only. It is, 
however, positive, though statistically insignificant, for managers’ employment. 
The positive result for manager’s employment is rather unexpected. However, it 
can be interpreted and justified intuitively. Firstly, the industrial sector and 
labour market in the country have reached a certain level of maturity, and now 
reward education and specialisation compared with non-technical manual work. 
This is indicated by the positive impact of employment for non-workers. Since 
this factor is independent of the change of ownership, it has not been reflected 
there, but manifests itself through the second dummy variable. Secondly, the 
result seems to reflect a change of emphasis in investment from labour-intensive 
to capital-intensive industries in Pakistan, a trend which has been captured by the 
dummy for structural adjustment programme. Lastly, the result shows a growing 
divergence between high-paid and low-paid workers. The structural adjustment 
programmes are known to recommend difficult economic decisions such as 
reduction of subsidies, which increase the incidence of poverty, and have been 
notorious for increasing inequality between the rich and the poor. This trend is 
also supported by the studies on Pakistan conducted by Kemal (1996, 2000) and 
Majid (2000), who find that both privatisation and structural adjustment 
programme are responsible for the negative impact. 
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As for the other variables included in the first stage, the relationship is 
supported by economic theory. The lagged dependent variables are positive and 
statistically significant, highlighting the importance of allowing for partial 
adjustment. The relationship between wages and employment is inverse, indicating 
that higher wages will lead to lower employment levels. Similarly, the value of 
output is positively related with employment, showing a positive relationship with 
employment levels. The last regression shows that though a rise in output leads to 
better employment prospects, it is negatively related with wages. This is because a 
rise in wages increases the price of a product and lowers its competitiveness in the 
market, which would eventually reduce the output level.  
 
7.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Birdsall and Nellis (2002) point out that in terms of the social impact of 
privatisation, there are so many variations, discrepancies and inconsistencies across 
countries that it is not possible to generalise the evidence gleaned from one country. 
It will, therefore, be fair to assert that the empirical evidence from this study is valid 
and applicable to Pakistan only, since it is highly unlikely that exactly similar 
settings will exist in another country. It is possible to infer a number of policy 
implications from this study. 
Firstly, we find that privatisation is expected to have negative consequences, 
at least in the short-run, and, as discussed earlier, this research reports short term 
results. It is only after the initial shock of privatisation is over and the economy is 
geared towards fast economic growth that we should anticipate a positive impact of 
privatisation. In Pakistan, only a few years have elapsed since privatisation, and a 
negative impact of privatisation is the most likely and probable outcome. Rather a 
positive impact would have been unexpected and against the general trend observed 
around the world. 
Secondly, we find that privatisation is an economic strategy that is very 
closely associated and blended with other macro-economic policies of a country. 
This is reflected in the statistical significance of dummy variable for the change of 
ownership and structural adjustment programme. 
Thirdly, a generous golden handshake package rather than privatisation is to 
blame for relatively large number of redundancies in the privatised firms in Pakistan. 
The result was that on average 63.3 percent workers opted for the golden handshake 
scheme for which the Privatisation Commission paid Rs 7.9 billion or 9.5 percent of 
privatisation proceeds [PC (2002)]. This amount is quite significant if we keep in 
view the fact that most of the enterprises privatised were small, and according to 
Kemal (1993, 2000), their share in employment was less than 7.0 percent6 of total 
 
6According to Kemal (1993), the total number of employees in public enterprises are 0.5 million, 
while Kemal (2000) estimates that 35,000 employees have joined the private sector through divestment of 
firms. 
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employment in public enterprises. If a similar package is offered to the several 
hundred thousand employees working in large enterprises such as WAPDA, 
Railways, PTCL and Pakistan Steel, the government can end up paying 
unsustainable sums of money. Another point to note is that this money is “wasted” in 
the sense that most of the workers were re-employed by the same companies on a 
contractual basis [ILO (1996)]. 
Fourthly, though we do not have explicit data to comment on the shifting 
patterns of casual labour employed in the edible oil and cement sectors, it is still 
possible to make inferences on the basis of empirical evidence emerging from this 
study. The regression results show that the impact of privatisation was negative for 
total and workers employment to the extent of 13 and 11.6 percent.7  This is in 
marked contrast with 63.3 percent overall retrenchment in the country, and 55.2 
percent average reduction in employment for the edible oil and cement sectors. We 
can estimate with the help of this differential that 42.9 percent8 new employees were 
hired in the two sectors, though in the absence of concrete data, it is not possible to 
suggest how many of these were retrenched employees. This finding is further 
supported by a study done by ILO (1996); and another study conducted by Shahid 
Ahmad Associates (1989), and reported by Majid (2000), that the ratio of contract 
workers in total industrial labour force increased from 4.9 percent in 1980-81 to 6.3 
percent in 1987-88. He suggests that it is very likely that this trend has continued 
through the 1990s. Based on this supplementary evidence, we can presume that a 
large number of employees were re-employed by the privatised firms who had opted 
for the golden handshake scheme. 
Fifthly, the privatised firms typically employed more workers and managers 
even after large scale retrenchment. This shows that the erstwhile public sector firms 
were not able to fully shed their historical legacy, and are less efficient and less 
productive than other firms in the private sector. 
Sixthly, the employees in the privatised sector initially had lower wages 
compared with their counterparts in the private sector. It so appears that privatisation 
proved a traumatic experience that not only resulted in a sharp and precipitous fall in 
wages, but also lowered the wage level so much that it even goes below the 
market/industry average. It is after a gap many years that the wages reach the 
industry average. 
Seventhly, the study indicates that the industrial sector and labour market in 
Pakistan have reached a certain level of maturity; and now reward education, 
technical know-how and specialisation. This is indicated by the positive impact for 
managers’ employment, which is reflected through the second dummy variable for 
the structural adjustment programme.  
 
7It was negative but statistically insignificant for managers’ employment. 
8Average retrenchment in the edible oil and cement sector minus average employment reduction 
indicated by the results obtained through regression analysis. 
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Last, but not the least, important policy implication is the significance of 
institutional approach to reform and restructuring, which should precede privatisation. 
Lack of effective institutional framework was a deterrent to the initiation of 
privatisation in the country and is still one of the factors for delaying the divestment of 
large public enterprises. This is notwithstanding the issues relating to the sequencing of 
reforms as pointed out by the World Bank (1987), cited in Majid (2000).  
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
We have looked at the relationship between privatisation, efficiency, and 
equity from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. At the theoretical level, 
we find that privatisation has economic value, though it has social consequences. 
The empirical results, as a whole, show a negative impact of privatisation and 
structural adjustment programme in the short term. We find that privatisation has a 
significantly negative impact on total and workers’ employment. It is also negative 
for managers’ employment and output, though it is statistically insignificant. SAP 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on workers employment and output. 
However, the impact of the programme is positive for managers’ employment, 
though it is statistically insignificant. 
We conclude with an observation from Stiglitz (1992) which he makes for 
transitional economies but is equally applicable to Pakistan. He says that there is no 
single right or best way of doing things. If we start looking for that it would lead to a 
paralysis. He cites from V. Klaus who says: “reform was like playing a chess game. 
No one, not even the best players, can, at the beginning of the game, see all the way 
to the end. Better players can, however, see more steps into the future than can worse 
players” (page 201). What we hope is that the economic and social consequences of 
privatisations are properly accounted for, and appropriate safeguards are provided 
when Pakistan goes for the divestment of its large public enterprises.  
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